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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH: MILLY O. BERNARD, Chairman; 
OLOF E. ZUNDEL, Commissioner; and 
KENNETH RIGTRUP, Commissioner, 
Defendants and Respondents 
BRIEF OF INTERVENOR - APPELLANT 
BUSINESS TELEPHONE SYSTEMS OF UTAH, INC. 
PRELIMINARY STA'rEMENT, DISPOSITION 
BELOW, AND RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
No. 15701 
This is an appeal from a Final Report and Order of the 
Public Service Commission of Utah ("Commission" or "PSC"), in 
PSC Case No. 76-049-01, approving several business telephone 
equipment iervice tariffs filed by Mountain States Telephone 
and Telegraph Company ("Mountain Bell", "MBT" or "Applicant"). 
Appellant Business Telephone Systems, Inc. ("BTS"), Intervenor 
below, challenges the lawfulness of a new Mountain Bell con-· 
tract payment plan, and of a Mountain Bell costing methodology, 
sanctioned by the Commission for use in connection with competi-
tive terminal telephone equipment services. Intervenor-
Appellant seeks reversal of the Report and Order of the 
Commission, and rejection of both the two-tier lease-contract 
tariffs and the incremental pricing methodology approved by 
the PSC for use by Mountain Bell. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Fu ding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Procedural History 
On September 1, 1976, Mountain Bell filed a Petition and 
accompanying tariff sheets with respect to a business tele-
phone service, known as Dimension 400 PBX, which it proposed 
to offer. Though suspended· initially for a brief period of 
time, the proposed tariffs were made effective by order dated 
October 1, 1976, "subject to the further modification, amend-
ment, or suspension of said tariff by the Commission 
The Dimension PBX tariffs provided the customer with the op-
tion of paying for service under one of two payment plans, a 
"two-tier" or "lease payment" plan, and a "conventional", or 
straight monthly payment plan. While the second, or "conven-
tional", payment plan levies a traditional single rate for 
each month that the customer subscribes to service, as noted 
below, the two-tier lease payment concept is far more complex. 
(See Ex. 2, R. 1492~ Tr. 46-47, 67-73.) 
On· September 22, 1976, Appellant Business Telephone 
Systems of Utah, Inc. ("BTS"), was officially admitted by the 
Commission as an intervenor in Case No. 76-049-01. 
On October 15, 1976, Mountain Bell filed a proposal to 
restructure, along the lines proposed in the Dimension 400 PBX 
tariff, the manner in which other of its business telephone 
!/See Order of PSC, issued October 1, 1976, R. 1137-43. 
.!/ 
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services are provided in the State of Utah. This proposal was 
consolidated for hearing with the Dimension 400 PBX petition 
on December 2, 1976, and the PSC indicated that the Commission 
would determine, following the close of hearings, the Commission 
would determine whether these other tariffs should be "suspended, 
amended or made permanent". (Tr. 315) 
Finally, on November 5, 1976, Mountain Bell filed a 
Petition and accompanying tariff sheets by which it proposed 
to offer still another telephone system service, known as 
ComKey 2152, on the two-tier, incremental cost basis. This 
third set of tariffs became effective on December 4, 1976, 
subject to further Order after hearing. Hearings on this ad-
ditional matter were consolidated with the Petition and propo-
sal already consolidated in Case No. 76-049-01. 
Hearings were held November 29 and 30, 1976, December 1 
and 2, 1976, and February 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8, 1977. 
On December 2, 1977, the Commission entered its Final 
Report and Order in PSC Case No. 76-049-01, approving 
Mountain Bell's Dimension 400 PBX petition, its ComKey 2152 
2/ 
petition, and its business telephone services proposal.-
l/Intervenor-Appellant BTS was not immediately served with 
the PSC's Final Report and Order, but, after learning about 
it by telephone during the second week of December, 1977, 
Intervenor's counsel called the Secretary of the Commission 
and requested a copy thereof, which was ultimately received 
by undersigned counsel on December 16, 1977. 
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on January 4, 1978, BTS filed an Appliation for Rehearing with 
the Commission, which was denied on January 30, 1978. The in-
stant proceeding was commenced by the filing of a Petition for 
writ of Certiorari on March 1, 1978. By motion filed May 30, 
1978, Mountain Bell moved to dismiss BTS's Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari and to quash the Writ issued pursuant thereto. 
MBT's motion was denied by this Court on June 9, 1978. 
Subsequently, by motion filed June 12, 1978, Mountain Bell 
moved for reconsideration of its Motion to Dismiss BTS's 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, but said Motion for 
Reconsideration was, in turn, denied by this Court on June 13, 
1978. 
2. Two-Tier TelaLease Pricing and Mountain Bell's 
Incremental Costing Methodology 
All of the terminal telephone equipment tariffs at issue 
in PSC Case No. 76-049-01 offer the customer two-tier lease 
rates as well as a conventional payment plan. The two-tier 
or lease payment plan purportedly divides the cost of terminal 
telephone equipment service into two components and utilizes 
present worth analysis. The first component, or Tier "A" por-
tion of the rate, is paid over a predetermined initial payment 
contract period which is as long as, or shorter than, the full 
economic life of the equipment involved. As the Commission 
observed in its Report and Order: 
Mountain Bell proposed to make available 
to Utah business customers the two-tier 
TelaLease payment option of 3, 5, 7 or 10 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Libr ry. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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years, as the case may be, for PBX and 
fixed key telephone service. Under the 
TelaLease option, the telephone customer's 
monthly payment consists principally of 
two portions or tiers: capital-related 
costs and expense-related costs. "Tier A" 
is payable over a fixed period of time 
of either 3, 5, 7 or 10 years depending 
upon the type of terminal equipment pro-
vided. At the end of the fixed payment 
period, "Tier A" payments terminate. 
"Tier B" payments run contemporaneously 
with "Tier A" but continue after "Tier A" 
payments end. "Tier B" is composed of a 
fixed portion and a variable portion, 
both of which are payable throughout 
the period a customer retains the service. 
(Report and Order, p. 6, R. 1139) 
Under the TelaLease proposal, if a customer discontinues 
service pursuant to the two-tier lease plan prior to the ex-
piration of the initial contract period, a termination charge 
is levied equal to the sum of the monthly charges for the un-
expired portion of the initial lease period. Presumably, the 
Tier "A" rates are designed to recover non-recurting-capital 
costs. Tier "A" rates are not subject to change for any par-
ticular customer, although new vintage Tier "A" rates, for 
new customers, may be filed from time to time. The second 
component, or Tier "B" rate, is divided into a variable por-
tion, designed to recoup recurring expenses, and a constant 
portion equal to 18% of the Tier "A" rate, designed to re-
cover part of the capital costs. The Tier "B" rate continues 
for so long as the customer keeps his service, is not set by 
lease, is always subject to change, and is the same for all 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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subscribers at any given time. (Ex. 2, R. 1492; Ex. 5; Tr. 
46-47, 67-73, 117-18, 159-60, 215-16) 
Under the TelaLease payment option, the customer alleged-
ly makes a contractual commitment to pay a fixed monthly rate 
for a fixed period of years. This Tier "A" charge is designed 
to recover the three basic components of capital cost,~-~·, 
"depreciation, the cost of money and the income tax". (Tr. 
131; and see Tr. 215-16) Once established for a given instal-
lation, the Tier "A" rate applicable to that customer is in-
tended by Mountain Bell to remain unchanged and is not subject 
to rate increase: 
The applicable monthly Fixed rent will 
apply without change during the Fixed 
Rent Payment Period. (See original sheet 
23, Part 11, Section 6 ~the Dimension 
400 PBX tariff, R. 1068; Tr. 157.) 
Turning to the Mountain Bell's incremental costing method-
ology, utilized for competitive services only, the PSC's Report 
and Order states that all of the terminal telephone equipment 
tariffs in question filed by Mountain Bell were based upon a 
so-called Long Run Incremental Analysis (LRIA) "taking into 
account cost factors, demand elasticity, cross-elasticity, 
payment plans, incrementalism and contribution". (Report and 
Order, p. 7, R. 1140) According to Mountain Bell, the basic 
purposes of its LRIA: 
are to estimate the future impact of 
a pricing decision, because all pricing de-
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cisions are made for results that they 
will cause in the future. And it - the 
second purpose is to use a tool for se-
lecting prices. (Tr. 63) 
The salient feature of Mountain Bell's LRIA, for purposes of 
this appeal, is that it represents an incremental approach to 
costs. This incremental approach takes into account only 
"directly related" or additional costs of administration re-
sulting from the particular new service (Tr. 452) and ignores 
or overlooks common overhead costs of the utility. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I - THE COMMISSION ERRED IN APPROVING THE TWO-TIER 
TELALEASE PAYMENT PLAN. 
A. The Two-Tier TelaLease Payment Plan Concept 
Constitutes A Predatory, Anti-Competitive, 
Exclusionary Pricing Technique In Restraint Of Trade 
Which Is Designed And Intended To Maintain Mountain 
Bell's Monopoly In The Terminal Telephone Equipment 
Market In Utah. 
State regulatory agencies have repeatedly been required 
to consider and enforce antitrust policies where public util-
ity services are concerned. Gulf States Utilities Co. v. 
Federal Power Comm'n., 411 U.S. 747 (1973); Otter Tail Power 
3/ 
Co. v. United States, 410 u.s. 366 (1973)- Appellant respect-
fully submits that the Commission below did not properly con-
sider or enforce these policies. 
3/See also Northern California Power Agency v. California 
Public Utilities Comm'n., 96 Cal. Rep. 18, 46 P. 2d 1218 
(1971), where the California state regulatory body was re-
quired to consider the antitrust laws, both state and fed-
eral, in the case of a public utility company seeking to con-
struct and operate an electric power plant; Phonetele, Inc. 
v. Public Utilities Comm'n., 113 Cal. Rep. 16, 520 P. 2d 400 
(1974), in which the Supreme Count of California, in applying 
the law of Northern California Power Agency to a telephone in-
terconnection tariff, articulated principles calling upon the 
Commission to carefully weigh competitive factors to assure 
that a tariff was not being, and would not be, used for anti-
competitive monopoly purposes. 
In addition, several state regulatory agencies have con-
sidered and applied antitrust principles specifically to 
two-tier contract tariffs. For example, the Colorado Public 
Utilities Commission, in its decision of November 26, 1975 
in Docket No. 881, rejecting a two-tier TelaLease tariff 
proposed by Mountain Bell for ComKey service, stated: 
(footnote continued on next page) 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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In a Report and Order totally devoid of citations to the 
transcript or exhibit evidence in this case, the Commission 
made only the following conclusory statements: 
10. The TelaLease or two-tier concept of 
pricing is not anti-competitive in nature 
and will not artificially enable Mountain 
Bell to maintain its market position ••• 
11. The two-tier concept of pricing is a 
permissible offering in this jurisdiction 
and is a reasonable response from Mountain 
Bell to the competitive market in which it 
must offer its terminal equipment. 
(Report and Order of December 2, 1977, at 
11-12, R. 1142) 
From these summary opinions, it is absolutely impossible to 
determine the reasoning processes which led the Commission to 
reach its conclusions. The PSC's Report and Order amounts to 
little more than an arbitrary dismissal of Interven.or-Appellant' s 
(footnote continued from. previous page) 
The Commission recognizes the benefits 
that have accrued to the public through 
the introduction of competition •.• 
[C]ompetition in the areas of termi-
nal telephone systems equipment has been 
declared to be in the public interest. 
Given this declaration of public policy, 
it is the Commission's opinion that it 
should consider the state antitrust laws 
in determining whether the proposed tar-
iffs are just and reasonable. [ citations 
omitted] (Decision of November 26, 1975, 
on reargument in Docket No. 881, at 21-22) 
See also Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities Docket 
1840~ecision of April 26, 1976, at 12-13, aff'd, New 
England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. D.P.U., 363 N.E. 2d 519 (Mass. 
Sup. Ct. 1977) 
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allegations, without any attempt to come to grips with the is-
sues and evidence raised and introduced below. In fact, the 
Commission's decision is contrary to the manifest weight of 
the evidence, and is erroneous in view of the reliable, proba-
tive and substantial evidence on the whole record. 
The fallacious and arbitrary nature of the Commission's 
opinion is underscored by the fact that a third party, the 
Utah State Attorney General, independently scrutinized the 
record evidence and filed a comprehensive amicus curiae brief 
carefully explaining to the Commission how the antitrust laws 
·apply to the facts of this case, and why, in the opinion of 
the Attorney General's Antitrust, Trade Regulation and Consumer 
Protection Section, 
••• this Commission is legally obligated 
to reject the tariff proposed by Mountain 
Bell in this proceeding due to the serious 
anti-competitive effect that its approval 
would have in the. market for PBX systems. 
The two aspects of the proposal that are 
most objectionable from an antitrust stand-
point are the long-term leasing provisions 
as.sociated with the TelaLease and the un-
derpricing of Dimension equipment and ser-
vices. The record indicates that these 
two practices are designed to maintain, 
increase and prevent erosion of Mountain 
Bell~s dominance in the PBX market by 
working to exclude and eliminate present 
and potential competition. (Brief of 
Attorney General, p. 26, R. 1410)1/ 
4/0n November 30, 1977, the Assistant Attorney General, 
Antitrust Division, filed a brief on behalf of the Attorney 
General of Texas before the Public Utility Commission of 
(footnote continued on next page) 
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It is egregious, and inexcusable, that other than a mere pass-
ing reference to the fact that the Attorney General filed a 
brief before the Commission (Report and Order, p. 4, R. 1138), 
no mention, discussion or analysis of the antitrust implica-
tions of the two-tier TelaLease concept appears anywhere in 
5/ 
the Commission's Report and Order.-
As noted by the Utah State Attorney General, the long-
term two-tier TelaLease pricing concept violates well estab-
lished principles of federal antitrust law. The offense of 
monopolization involves two elements: 
(1) possession of monopoly power in the 
relevant market; and 
(2) willful opposition or maintenance of 
that power as distinguished from growth 
or development as a consequence of a 
sup~rior product, business acumen, or his-
torical precedent. (United States v. 
Grinnell Corp., 384 u.s. 563 at 570-71 
(1966)) (emphasis added) 
Monopoly power, in turn, is defined as "[t]he power to con-
trol prices or exclude competition in a relevant market". 
Grinnell, supra, at 571. 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
Texas, in Docket No. 156. At issue was a Dimension PBX 
tariff similar to MBT's tariff in Utahr filed by Southwestern 
Bell Telephone Company. That brief concurred wholeheartedly 
with the Utah State Attorney General's antitrust allegations. 
~/Indeed, the Commission paid such little heed to the anti-
trust arguments that it even neglected to list in its Report 
and Order any appearance by the Antitrust, Trade Regulation 
and Consumer Protection Section of the Attorney General's of-
fice. 
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The very large percentage of the PBX market in the State 
of Utah controlled by Mountain Bell leaves no doubt that 
6/ 
Mountain Bell is a monpolist.- Prior to 1968, Mountain Bell 
was the sole supplier of terminal telephone equipment in the 
State of Utah, and thus enjoyed an absolute monopoly over the 
provision of PBX and key telephone equipment throughout the 
area of its operation. It was only following the 1968 deci-
sion of the Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter 
of the Use of Carterfone Device, 13 FCC 2d 420 , recon. deniec 
14 FCC 2d 571 (1968) ("Carterfone") - holding, inter alia, 
that AT&T tariffs prohibiting the interconnection of customer-
provided telephone terminal equipment were unjust and unrea-
sonable under the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 u.s.c 
151 et ~ - that Mountain Bell [and indeed the entire Bell 
Telephone System of which it is an integral part] began to ex-
periene some slight competition in the provision of PBX and 
key telephone terminal equipment and services. Both the 
7/ 
Federal Communications Commission- and the Massachusetts 
6/As of the time of hearing of this case, the total number of 
Mountain Bell's PBX and key telephone customers in the State 
of Utah was 9,410. (Tr. 234) By contrast, there were only 
211 interconnect PBX and key telephone systems in the State 
of Utah, according to Mountain Bell's own estimate. (Tr. 401: 
Thus, MBT's share of the total market is 98%. (Tr. 472) 
21 The present unlawfulness of the tariff 
also permeates its past. It has been un-
reasonable and unreasonably discrimina-
tory since its inception for the reasons 
(footnote continued on next page) 
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8/ 
Department of Public Utilities- have held that Bell's mono-
polization over telephone equipment was unlawfully obtained. 
Mountain Bell, through its two-tier TelaLease payment con-
cept, is now striving to maintain its monopoly position 
9/ 
through the use of an anti-competitive pricing technique.-
The widely recognized decision in United States v. United 
Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F.Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953) aff'd ~ 
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954), presents a situation very analo-
(footnote continued from previous page) 
given above. That the Telephone Company 
may not have known prior to the proceed-
ings herein that the Carterfone was in 
fact harmless is in fact irrelevant, 
since they barred its use without regard 
to its effect upon the telephone system. 
Furthermore, the tariff was the carrier's 
own. It was not prescribed by the 
Commission. It has remained subject to 
complaint and to a finding that it had 
been unlawful since its inception. 
A Commission-prescribed r.ate or practice 
must be followed by the carrier. It be-
comes the lawful rate or practice. But 
where the carrier itself initiates the 
rate or practice its unlawfulness remains 
open, not only to a proseective finding, 
but also to a retrospective one. 
(Carterfone, supra, at 4'25) (emphasis 
added) 
8/Mass. D.P.u. Docket 18403, Decision of April 21, 1976, 
supra, at 24) 
9/As Justice Learned Hand has recognized, " •.. no monopo-
list monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing". United 
States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 416, 462 
(2nd Cir. 1945) 
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gous to the one at bar. United Shoe held, because of United 
Shoe's monopoly position, that United's ten-year leases for 
10/ 
shoe manufacturing machinery~ constituted monopolization in 
11/ 
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.~ As in United 
Shoe, Mountain Bell refuses to sell its PBX and key telephone 
equipment outright to the public. As in United Shoe, Mountain 
Bell's Dimension PBX leases require a commitment to obtain, or 
at least pay for, 10 years of service. As in United Shoe, 
MBT' s leases are designed to perpetuate Bell·' s monopoly status 
in an area which has now been opened to competition. As a 
practical matter, service is provided only by means of long-
10/Lest the similarity between the telephone and shoe machin-
ery industry be regarded as attenuated, it must be noted that 
the relationship between the two industries dates back to the 
very early days of the telephone. As John Brooks observed in 
his recent book on the history of the Bell System: 
••• [S]omewhere along the way [Gardiner] 
Hubbard made what would prove to be one of 
the key decisions in telephone's corporate 
history - the decision to rent telephone 
service rather than to sell telephones ap-
parently based on a previous successful 
experience of Hubbard's in leasing shoe-
making machinery. [Brooks, Telephone, the 
First Hundred Years, Harper & Rowe, 1975, 
at 55] (emphasis added) · 
11/Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 u.s.c. §2 states: "Every 
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopo-
lize any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a 
misdemeanor •... " Similarly, the Utah Code, Section 50-1-3, 
makes it unlawful for any corporation to enter into any agree-
ment, or combination to "monopolize any part of trade or com-
merce". 
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term leases, since the alternative traditional month-to-month 
rental rates have been set so high in relation to two-tier 
TelaLease rates as to be very unappealing to the vast bulk of 
12/ 
MBT's business customers. (Tr. 570, Ex. I-8, R. 1535, p. 56)~ 
In United Shoe, Judge Wyzanski noted: 
Much of United's market power is trace-
able to the magnetic policies inherent in 
its system of leasing. 
* * * 
Yet, they (the leasing practices) are not 
practices which can be properly described 
as the inevitable consequences of ability, 
natural forces, or law. They represent 
something more than the use of accessible 
resources, the processes of invention and 
innovation, and the employment of those 
techniques of employment, financing, pro-
duction, and distribution, which a com-
petitive society must foster. These are 
contracts, arrangements, and policies, 
which, instead of encouraging competition 
based on pure merit, further the dominance 
of a particular firm. In this sense they 
are unnatural barriers~ they unnecessarily 
exclude the actual and. potential competi-
tion~ they restrict the free market. 
While the law allows many enterprises to 
use such practices, the Sherman Act is 
now construed by superior courts to for-
bid the continuance of effective market 
control based in part upon such practices. 
(110 F.Supp. at 344-45) (emphasis added) 
The record evidence in this case, particularly Exhibit 
I-1, R. 1529, the "Two-Tier Contract Plan" made available by 
!, 12/And see Ex. I-8, R. 1935, J.W.-19, which shows the re~a­
tionship between the regular monthly rates and the two-tier 
TelaLease rates for Dimension PBX. 
\ 
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the American Telephone and Telegraph Company ("AT&T") to MBT 
in 1973 (Tr. 104), overwhelmingly demonstrates that two-tier 
TelaLease pricing is anti-competitive, both in purpose and 
intent. The evidence shows that it was designed to restrain 
and eliminate what little competition presently exists in the 
terminal telephone equipment market in Utah. 
By its own language the Two-Tier Plan applies only to 
competitive telephone products and directs MBT to use, in mar-
kets of high ~ompetitive vulnerability, contracting devices 
which lock customers into Bell services over a period of 
years, and to thereby join in AT&T's anti-competitive scheme. 
(See Ex. I-1, R. 1529, Section 4 and Section 7, p. 2) 
Section l of the Two-Tier Contract Plan directs the at-
tention of MBT to the necessity for market analysis, includ-
ing determination of "competitive price levels". Once this 
fi~st step is taken and a market price is established, 
Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Plan emphasize the importance 
"from a regulatory aspect" of cost studies designed to sup-
port or: justify the selected "competitive price level". It 
ii thus clear that, from the outset, AT&T directed MBT that 
the price of competitive offerings should be dictated pri-
13/ 
marily by competitive, as opposed to cost, considerations.~ 
The Two-Tier Contract Plan constitutes a master plot for im-
13/Indeed, MBT concedes: "We price according to what the 
market says is - is the right price". (Tr. 54) 
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plementation of a radical new two-tier pricing technique~ it 
discusses market and rate strategies (Section 3), and pre-
sents illustrative tariffs in contract form (Section 4) com-
plete with rates and a computer program which can be used to 
calculate two-tier costs. 
Finally, the AT&T Two-Tier Contract Plan also outlines 
how telephone companies should "handle" state regulatory com-
missions, with specified directions and instructions relating 
to lobbying, in order to gain acceptance of two-tier lease 
pricing and to preclude or minimize intervention and hearing. 
Section 6 of the Plan (Ex. I-1, R. 1529) underscores the ne-
cessity for pre-tariff lobbying: 
State regulators must be made aware of the 
problem areas brought about by outside ven-
dors and the realistic solutions made pos-
sible by unusual and often controversial 
new services. This requires direct involve-
ment in company planning on the part of state 
regulatory contact people. Their knowledge 
of the Commission can greatly assist planning 
efforts ...• [I]t pays off in a better un-
derstanding and a more permissive climate 
(Ex. I-1, R. 1529, Section 6) (Emphasis added) 
In addition, Exhibits I-8, R. 1535, J.W.-17 and J.W.-18 
demonstrate that Mountain Bell received from its parent com-
pany, AT&T, guidelines and directives designed to insure that 
two-tier rates would in practice provide a very strong economic 
inducement for MBT's customers to enter into long-term ser-
vice contracts, rather than to subscribe to telephone service 
on a traditional monthly basis. (Ex. I-8, R. 1535, p. 56) 
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The record is replete with references by several witnesses 
to the lock-in effect of two-tier TelaLease pricing. (See Ex. 
I-8, R. 1535, p. 42; Tr. 650; 1001.) Such views were voiced 
not only by the Intervenor-Appellant, but also by other inter-
connect companies (Tr. 262), by a representative of the 
University of Utah (Tr. 268), and by the Commission staff's 
own witness, Mr. Hogstrom. (Ex. D-1, R. 1526, pp. 12-13) 
Mr. Hogstrom indicated: 
There is the danger that if we allow 
Mountain Bell to offer telalease contracts, 
then the market will be closed to competi-
tion. 
* * * 
••. the possibility exists that with the 
adoption of these telalease tariffs, a 
large segment, if not all of the market, 
would be closed to competition • • . . 
[T]he competitor has most likely lost that 
opportunity for the life of the telalease 
con~ract. This brings up the possibility 
of Mountain Bell "locking up" the market-
place for a number of years by this means. 
(Ex. D-1, R. 1526, pp. 12-13) 
Finally, the record evidence demonstrates that in view of 
Mountain Bell's overwhelming 98% monopoly share of the PBX and 
key telephone market in the State of Utah (Tr. 234, 472), its 
very favorable win/loss record even in the absence of two-tier 
TelaLease pricing (Ex. 14, R. 1522, Tr. 388, 391, 488), the 
marketing experience and expertise of MBT (Tr. 32, 383-85), 
and the stringency of MBT's lease service arrangement (Tr. 115, 
151, 160, 170, 207, 731-32, 968, 922-23), that denial of two-
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tier TelaLease pricing would not unduly handicap Mountain Bell 
in the terminal telephone equipment market. 
To all of the above evidence, the PSC turned a deaf ear. 
As Intervenor-Appellant's witness, Dr. Wilson, stated: 
"The conduct of a firm has to be evaluated in terms of its 
competitive or anti-competitive impact based upon the posture, 
the position, the dominance that that firm holds within the 
market." (Tr. 923) Such an evaluation was most assuredly not 
14/ 
performed by the Utah Public Service Commission in this case. 
The Utah Commission did not allude at all to any of the over-
whelming evidence marshalled by Intervenor-Appellant, summa-
rized above, and set forth in detail at pages 25-37 (R. 1299-
1311) of Intervenor's initial brief to the Commission. 
Because Mountain Bel·l in the past has relied on the Tenth 
Circuit u.s. Court of Appeal's.decision in Telex Corp. v. 
Internat'l. Bus. Mach. Corp., 510 F.Supp. 894 (1975), it must 
be noted, even before a responsive Brief is submitted, that 
any such reliance on Telex by Mountain Bell would be entirely 
misplaced. First, United Shoe was appealed to, and affirmed 
~ cur iam by, t.he United States Supreme Court. The validity 
14/0bviously, when a company with 98% of the market locks up 
customers, that company's market share begins to approach 
100%, and competition is totally eliminated. When a company 
with less than 1% of the market ties up a customer for a 
period of years, the effect is pro-competitive and the con-
tinued existence of at least minimal competition is guaran-
5, teed. 
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of Telex v. IBM was never passed upon by, and the case is not 
now pending before, the United States Supreme Court. If in 
fact there were any inconsistency between United Shoe and 
Telex, then surely the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion, rather 
than the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals, must control. 
Second, in actuality the decision in Telex. actually sup-
ports Intervenor-Appellant herein. The trial court in Telex 
found that IBM did not possess a monopoly since it enjoyed 
just over 35% of the market in 1970, down.from 64% in 1952. 
(510 F.2d at 898-99) As noted earlier, in this case Mountain 
Bell's market share is 98%~ down from 100%. 
Moreover, in the Telex case, the leasing plan approved 
by the Appellate Court was one used by all competitors. (510 
F.2d at 902-03, 906) That is not the case in this instance. 
The record below contains little or no support for the notion 
that the contract-lea~ing scheme inherent in Mountain Bell's 
two-tier TelaLease concept constitutes an ordinary and typical 
marketing method employed by other competitors in the market. 
At no place in the record is there any indication that 
Intervenor-Appellant, or any other interconnect supplier in 
Utah, utilizes "two-tier pricing". 
Interconnect equipment is sold outright. Maintenance is 
obtained pursuant to a separate contract, or on a time and ma-
terials basis, from either the equipment seller or another en-
tity. The purchaser need not obtain such maintenance from 
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the third party leasing company, as is the case when Mountain 
Bell leases equipment pursuant to its TelaLease plan. (Tr. 
1014-15, 1021-22) Whereas Intervenor-Appellant BTS sells 
equipment, title ultimately passing to the purchaser, Mountain 
Bell does not sell equipment. Title to the equipment never 
passes. Ownership is always retained by MBT, and the subscriber 
is not free to take his equipment anywhere within or without 
the State of Utah, to use it at another location, or to resell 
12_/ 
it if he so desires. (Tr. 115, 151, 160, 170, 207, 731-32, 
922-23, 968) In exchange for payment of the total cost of an 
interconnect piece of terminal equipment, the customer obtains 
a tangible benefit in the form of a substantial property in-
terest. When and if the customer elects to sell his equipment, 
to purchase new equipment from another supplier, or to obtain 
service from Mountain Bell, his property interest can be con-
verted into cash. The Mountain Bell customer receives no such 
benefit of title and merely obligates himself to pay for ser-
vice for a minimum period of years. Cbmpetitive suppliers are 
thereby "locked out" of the market, and the market is "locked 
up" for Mountain Bell. 
In contrast to the cursory treatment rendered by the 
Commission below, the Public Utilities Commission of the 
neighboring State of Colorado, in its first two-tier opinion 
15/The evidence below establishes that there is a significant 
market for used terminal telephone equipment. (Tr. 1021) 
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dealing with Mountain Bell (Decision No. 86791, issued May 6 
1975), considered allegations virtually identical to those 
advanced by Intervenor-Protestant herein. At issue was a 
tariff for ComKey telephone service proposed by Mountain 
Bell. The Colorado Commission stated: 
Respondent [Mountain Bell] finds itself 
faced with competition in the marketplace 
when in the very recent past it enjoyed a 
virtual monopoly position 
* * * 
It was in response to that competition 
that Respondent established the tariffs 
that are here under consideration. The 
Commission recognizes the benefits that 
have accrued to the public through the 
introduction of competition. 
* * * 
It is clear that Respondent has monopoly 
power within the relevant market because 
of its predominant share of the market 
which is in excess of 92% and because of 
Respondent's massive size and length of 
time·as the only source of supply in the 
market which has just recently changed •• 
The [two-tier lease] concept was de-
veloped in combination with AT&T and per-
haps Western and Bell Labs to beat the 
competition they were facing and thus 
violates the anti-trust statutes of this 
state. There is no reason or considera-
tion can justify this situation ... be-
cause of the anti-trust violation in-
volved with the tariff here under con-
sideration ... the tariffs here under 
suspension are found and concluded to be 
unjust and unreasonable. [Decision No. 
86791, May 6, 1975 at 16-18, 19] (empha-
sis added) 
And, in its subsequent Decision and Order on Reargument, 
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No. 87834, issued November 26, 1975, the Colorado Public 
Utilities Commission concluded, in affirming its prior deci-
sion: 
The Tele-Lease could be a means to enable 
respondent to continue its control over 
the • • • market and thus to tie up the 
market and accomplish the market coverage 
objective set by AT&T of 100% •••• 
(Decision No. 87834, p. 27) (emphasis 
added) 
In sum, the Commission erred in approving a two-tier 
TelaLease payment plan which is exclusionary, anti-competitive, 
and was designed and intended to restrain trade. 
In recognition of applicable antitrust laws, and in ac-
cordance with the independent judgment and opinion of the 
Utah State Attorney General, this Court should reject the two-
tier TelaLease payment concept, and the long-term service ar-
rangement inherent therein. Only by so doing, can this Court 
preserve and protect what little competition now exists in · 
the terminal telephone equipment market in Utah. 
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B. The Two-Tier TelaLease Payment Plan Concept Is 
Inherently And Unlawfully Discriminatory And 
Preferential, In That It Insulates The Rates Of 
Certain Select Subscribers To Competitive Services 
Against Increases In Capital-Related Costs, While 
Imposing The Burden Of Those Capital-Related Cost 
Increases On All Other Mountain Bell Ratepayers. 
The Tier "A" portion of Mountain Bell's TelaLease rate 
is designed to recover such capital-related costs as depre-
ciation, cost of money, and income taxes. (Tr. 131, 215-16) 
However, while the Tier "A" rate is fixed, these capital-
related costs are not fixed. The evidence below demonstrates 
that regardless of changes over time in the cost of money, 
and in the federal income tax rate, the customer's Tier "A" 
payments "will apply without change during the Fixed Rent 
Payment Period". (emphasis added) (See original Sheet 23, 
Part 11, Section 6 of the Dimension PBX tariff, R. 1068; Tr. 
157.) When these measurable capital-related costs change dur-
ing the service or economic life of a PBX or key telephone 
system, the Tier "A" portion of the T~laLease subscriber's 
rate should change, just like all other telephone utility sub-
scribers' rates change when these important capital costs in-
crease. MBT, which never sells equipment but instead provides 
a service over time, should not be permitted to guarantee the 
unchangeability of any rate. 
When the Utah Public Service Commission awards an in-
creased rate of return to the Company in a general rate case, 
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or when the applicable federal income tax rate increases, 
basic subscribers experience an increase in rates, regardless 
of the length of time they have subscribed to, or have agreed to 
subscribe to, telephone service. Under two-tier TelaLease 
pricing, two-tier customers, alone, are blessed with the privi-
lege of never having to incur a rate increase to reflect an 
increase in capital-related costs. Two-tier contract sub-
scribers simply do not share the burden of these increased 
. costs. No other MBT subscribers besides certain select busi-
ness customers are offered "a guarantee that a portion of 
their rates will not be subject to future rate increases". 
(Tr. 156) Residential customers who subscribe to basic tele-
phone service cannot "obtain that same sort of insulation 
against changes in the authorized rate of return by promising 
to sign up for a certain number of years of service". (Tr. 
170) As MBT's witness, Mr. Brown, stated on the· record, " •• 
the benefits of lease pricing are not available to a residen-
tial customer . • • unless he does require key telephone ser-
vice". (Tr. 221) 
Intervenor-Appellant's witness, Dr. Wilson, criticized 
the application of two-tier TelaLease vintage pricing to 
specific services in the following terms: 
What MB has proposed in this regard is a 
discriminatory pricing structure avail-
able only for a certain competitive pro-
duct, and available to only select cus-
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tomers located in market segments of its 
business which are vulnerable to competi-
tion. The attempt to recover capital in-
vestment in a PBX account via a two-tier 
pricing mechanism by incorporating a fixed-
term payment, while denying this pricing 
approach for the recovery of capital in-
vestment in other terminal equipment 
(su~h as the basic single-line telephone 
set) is discriminatory. Thus, for exam-
ple, if embedded costs continue to in-
crease over time, vintage Dimension PBX 
subscribers will be immune from parallel 
rate increases, and general telephone 
subscribers will be forced to bear the 
entire burden. 
* * * 
... Two-tier capital costs are not 
fixed for MB. Interest rates on debt, 
return on equity, depreciation rates and 
income rates change over time. As these 
changes occur, although they may be re-
flected in future vintages, the company 
expresses n~ intention to reach back in-
to prior two-tier vintage tariffs in or-
der to adjust the old capital rates to re-
flect current and future conditions. 
Under these circumstances, if, for exam-
ple, MB's capital costs rise in the 
future due to the maturing and refinanc-
ing of old cost debt, or if income taxes 
were to increase, older Dimension PBX 
customers will pay preferentially lower 
rates in relation to all other MB rate-
payers. This, too~ would result in a 
discriminatory rate structure for all 
Dimension PBX services. (Ex. I-8, R. 
1535, pp. 43-44)16/ 
16/Although Dr. Wilson's comments were directed at Dimension 
PBX, it is clear that his criticism is directed at the en-
tire two-tier TelaLease vintage pricing concept, and at "the 
pricing changes ... for items of business terminal equip-
ment ..• primarily ... PBX and key services". (Tr. 39, 
42~ Ex. 2, R. 1492) 
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The Staff of the Utah PSC concurred with Dr. Wilson's 
analysis. When asked whether he "saw any discrimination in-
herent in the two-tier lease tariff concept by virtue of the 
fact that those rates alone among all of Mountain Bell's rates 
are fixed or insulated against change", Mr. Hagstrom responded 
"we've got one class of customer ••• who is now going to get 
a different pricing option available to him that at the moment 
is not available to anybody else. If that's discrimination 
I guess so". (Tr. 714-15) The PSC closed its eyes to all 
this evidence. 
In response to the joint contention of the Commission's 
own Staff and Intervenor-Appellant, the Commission's Report 
and Order provides only the following conclusory statement: 
10. . .. said TelaLease concept is not 
discriminatory in nature either to other 
PBX customers, to other categories of 
telephone customers or as between two-
tier customers. (Report and Order, p. 11, 
R. 1142) 
Once again, the basis for the Commission's decision is 
obscure or non-existent. The Report and Order constitutes 
little more than an arbitrary dismissal of Intervenor's and 
Staff's contention, without any attempt to come to grips with 
the issues raised. It remains impossible to ascertain how or 
why the Commission reached the "findings and conclusions" 
which appear in its Report and Order. Blanket generalizations 
and summary conclusions are not sufficient in a case of this 
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magnitude and importance. Other than the unexplained state-
ments of the Commission that the terminal telephone equipment 
tariffs which are the subject of the proceeding are "not dis-
criminatory in nature" (Report and Order, p. 11, R. 1142) and 
are "non-discriminatory" (Report and Order, p. 12, R. 1142), 
no discussion, analysis or any other reference to the discri-
mination argument, or to the underlying evidence and MBT's 
failure to meaningfully refute that evidence, appear anywhere 
in the Commission's decision. The Commission's conclusion is 
thus totally naked and unsupported. 
By contrast, the Massachusetts Department of Public 
Utilities, in its two-tier contract pricing decision, based 
on a record and a tariff virtually identical to the one under 
review here, identified and declared illegal the very discrimi-
nation described by Dr. Wilson and recognized by Mr. Hogstrom: 
Tier A prices are founded upon an assump-
tion of fixed earnings and tax rates. 
Between 1970 and 1975, the Department has 
authorized four increases in earning 
rates for MBT • . • • The federal cor-
porate income rate has fluctuated between 
48 and 52 percent, while income tax rates 
in the Commonwealth have increased over 
the past decade. Under these uncertain 
conditions, there· is no assurance what 
the required level of capital costs and 
tax rates will be five years from now, 
let alone for the next decade. 
* * * 
Unde~ conditions of rising capital costs 
and income taxes, Plan I (two-tier) cus-
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tomers would be insulated from any in-
creases in these costs. 
In the event of an increase in such costs, 
NET would properly stay "whole" in that 
it would be entitled to recover all the 
taxes and a fair rate of return on its 
total investment. If revenue deficien-
cies were recouped in future years, they 
would be recouped from other classes of 
ratepayers. 
* * * 
Accordingly, the 2-tier plan can be re-
jected on the basis that it is unjustly 
discriminatory as against other classes 
of ratepayers. (Mass. D.P.U. Docket 18403, 
Decision of April 21, 1976, pp. 21-23, 
aff'd, New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
D.P.U. 363 N.E. 2d 519 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 
1977) (emphasis added) 
On appeal, in affirming the Department's rejection of 
two-tier contract pricing, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court. held that the D.P.U. 's disapproval of "rates which are 
unjust, unreasonable and otherwise discriminatory" was sup-
ported by "substantial evidence".· (New England Tel. & Tel. 
Co. v. D.P.U., 363 N.E. 2d 519 Mass, Sup. Ct. 1977) 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court stated: 
From this evidence, a reasonable mind 
could conclude that the Plan I price 
structure discriminated against cus-
tomers of NET's non-competitive services; 
that the ratemaking processes encouraged 
discrimination in favor of competitive ser-
vices; and that Plan I, therefore, was 
not in the public interest. (New England 
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. D.P.U., 363 N.E. 2d at 
524) 
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The only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the evidence 
submitted below in this case is the one reached by the 
Massachusetts regulatory body and affirmed by the Massachusetts 
17/ 
Supreme Court.~ 
Attempts by regulated Bell System operating telephone 
companies to fix terminal telephone equipment rates have been 
rejected by other conscientious regulatory commissions besides 
the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities. For example, 
the Montana Public Service Commission, in Docket No. 6496, 
stated in its Order No. 4389d of September 29, 1978: 
Included in the Tela-Lease contract is 
the provision that tier A rates will re-
main unchanged for the duration of the 
lease. The Commission reserves the right 
17/Very recently, the Massachusetts D.P.U. finally did ap-
prove a modified two-tier payment plan, but only after the 
New England Telephone and Telegraph Company struck from its 
two-tier .tariff all references to a fixed rate for the term 
of the .contract. The Mass. D.P.u. required the incorporation 
into NET's two-tier tariff of a practical, built-in safeguard 
against cross-subsidization in the form of an automatic Tier 
"A" supplement charge whenever there is any increase in capi-
tal costs. The D.P.U. stated: 
in order to address the question of 
future cross-subsidization, any increase 
in capital costs would have to apply auto-
matically to Tier "A" customers when ~ 
creased just as the increase would apply 
to other classes of ratepayers. (Mass. 
D.P.U. 19319, Order of March 31, 1978, 
pp. 7-8) (emphasis in original) 
The notion of a capital cost-related rate which is guaranteed 
against change was thus totally and finally rejected a second 
time by the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities. 
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to change this portion of the two-tier 
when its analysis indicates that an ad-
justment is warranted. To do otherwise 
would be to abrogate the Commission's 
responsibility for ongoing regulation of 
utility rates. The Tela-Lease contract 
shall inform customers that tier A pay-
ments may be changed by Commission action. 
(Order No. 4389d, Sept. 29, 1978, Finding 
77 at p. 28) 
Similarly, the Nebraska Public Service Commission, in 
Application No. 31287, entered June 24, 1976, although it al-
lowed a modified form of two-tier lease pricing for Northwestern 
Bell Telephone Company wrote: 
First, the provisions declaring that Tier 
"A" rates are fixed, not subject to change 
should not be allowed. The tariffs should 
be modified in order to clearly indicate 
to customers that Tier "A" rates are sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of this Commission 
and are subject to change upon order of the 
Commission and all customers subscribing to 
two-tier rates should be so notified. 
(Order, p. 6) 
Similarly, although the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission 
approved a modified two-tier rate, it ruled: 
New England Telephone Company cannot guar-
antee "no change" in Tier "A" rates to 
potential customers, in view of this 
Commission's jurisdiction over said 
rates and our ability to change said 
rates on our own motion. (Docket 1207, 
Opinion dated September 13, 1976, p. 10) 
In sum, the Commission erred in approving a payment 
structure which the record evidence shows unequivocally to 
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18/ 
be highly discriminatory.~ 
18/In this connection, it is ironic that the one gratuitous 
concession in the Commission's decision to the challenge to 
two-tier TelaLease tariffs posed by Intervenor and the 
Commission staff is really no concession at all. Finding No. 
13 of the Report and Order states: 
In order that customers entering into 
TelaLease with Mountain Bell might not be 
misled as to the continuing jurisdiction 
of this Commission, it is necessary that 
all tariffs relating to the TelaLease and 
the lease document itself contain language 
indicating that the Commission may at any 
time by proper administrative procedure 
change the variable portion of the "Tier 
B" under said leases. (Report and Order, 
P: 12, R. 1142) (emphasis added) 
This qu~~ation is the most glaring illustration of the 
Commission's failure to carefully consider the evidence in 
this case. The sole "revision" or "modification" to the 
tariffs ·ordered by the Commission really amounts to nothing 
more than a restat~ment of what i~ already contained in the 
proposed tariff. There never was any dispute in this case 
concerning the changeability of the "variable" portion of the 
Tier B rate, so that the Commission's order does not modify 
the original tariff at all. (Ex. I-6, R. 1534, Tr. 71) Had 
the Commission really reflected upon and considered the argu-
ments and the evidence in this case, it would not, and it 
c6uld not, in good conscience, have ordered an alleged "revi-
sion" which is really nothing more than a recapitulation of 
the tariff as initially proposed by MBT. It was always the 
fixed "Tier A" rate, and the constant portion of the "Tier B", 
which were the focal points of contention, and not the admit-
tedly changeable, variable portion of the "Tier B" rate. 
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C. The Methodology Utilized By Mountain Bell To Compute 
Net Book Investment For Two-Tier TelaLease Rate-Making 
Purposes Establishes The Dependency Of Two-Tier 
TelaLease Pricing On The Existence Of Monopoly Revenues. 
The evidence before the Commission demonstrates unequiv-
ocally that the "equated cost of money" ("ECM") methodology 
utilized by Mountain Bell to determine net book investment for 
two-tier TelaLease rate-making purposes necessarily results 
in rates which require cross-subsidization by other Mountain 
Bell ratepayers. (See Intervenor-Appellant's Brief to the 
Commission, pp. 102-05, R. 1376-79.) For two-tier TelaLease 
tariff purposes only, Mountain Bell computes the rate of re-
turn, or cost of money, based on only 62.5% of total original 
investment. (Tr. 908-09) Intervenor urged below that Mountain 
Bell's cost of money, or rate of return, for two-tier TelaLease 
purposes be based upon the Company's system-wide depreciation 
factor in 1975, which was in excess of 85%. (Ex. I-12, R. 
1540) 
The record evidence below shows that, under Mountain 
Bell's "equated cost of money" approach, during the first half 
of an asset's life (a PBX or a key telephone system), before 
the actually declining net book investment reaches the average, 
or mid-way point, of net book investment for a particular 
asset, the difference, or defficiency, must be made up by 
Mountain Bell's general ratepayers. Although, admittedly, 
the total cost of capital may be finally realized at the very 
end of the last year of a particular two-tier TelaLease asset's 
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life, so long as the number of two-tier TelaLease assets con-
tinues to increase over time, there will exist a perpetual de-
ficiency which must be made up by monopoly revenues. As 
Intervenor-Appellant's expert witness, Dr. Wilson, stated: 
..• We're dealing with a growing ele-
ment within the Company's ove~all rate 
base. Dimension PBX systems are growing 
in leaps and bounds in terms of propor-
tionate share of the rate base . . . . 
If you take a growing entity ... and 
you apply the equated cost of money you're 
going to end up with a repeated deficit 
year after year after year. That's why 
when you establish rates for a regulated 
electric utility you make a - you make an 
adjustment to the gross investment and 
plant and equipment by subtracting out 
accrued depreciation, but that usually 
winds up with a net investment of some-
where in the 75 to 85 percent of gross 
investment ballpark. (Tr. 936-37) 
It is essential, if two-tier rate-making is to be allowed at 
19/ 
all,- that c;tn appropriate depreciation factor be utilized 
which will be applicable, "over the period of time that the 
19/Although two-tier TelaLease pricing must be rejected for 
several reasons, it should be noted that it is theoretically 
possible to offer two-tier lease payment plans without uti-
lizing the equated cost of money concept. For example, Dr. 
Wilso.n used a much higher net or depreciated investment 
figure in his two-tier cost study than the 62% which results 
from MBT's ECM methodology. (Ex. I-8, 1535) Massachusetts 
has not allowed its local Bell Operating Telephone Company to 
utilize the ECM methodology in the modified two-tier lease pay-
ment plans which its regulatory body approved five months ago, 
and the California Public Utilities Commission has recognized 
the burden imposed on other groups of subscribers by the use, 
for two-tier tariff subscribers, of the equated cost of money 
methodology (See Ex. I-8, R. 1535, J.W.-16, p. 3.), and has re-
jected ECM even though it has allowed some ~wo-tier rates. 
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rates are going to be in effect". (Tr. 939) 
As if none of this evidence existed, the Commission's 
Report and Order contains no mention whatsoever of the 
Company's use of the "equated cost of money" methodology for 
two-tier TelaLease pricing purposes. No findings, discussion 
or reference to any of the evidence relating to the "equated 
cost of money" methodology appears anywhere in the Commission's 
decision. Other than the Commission's glib assertion that all 
the business terminal telephone equipment services in question 
"are priced at level which will recover for Mountain Bell all 
of its costs associated with the provision of said products 
and services," (Report and Order, p. 11, R. 1142) none of the 
intricacies of the net investment costing methodologies pro-
posed by Mountain Bell, on the one hand, and by Intervenor-
Appellant, on the other, are even referenced, much less re-
solved,· by the Commission. 
By contrast, the very "equated cost of money" methodology 
problems called to this Commission's attention by Intervenor-
Appellant were recognized and acknowledged by the Massachusetts 
Department of Public Utilities: 
A key component of the 2-Tier methodology 
is the ECM principle •.• under which 
reimbursement for capital costs would be 
obtained. As we see it, the ECM procedure 
is a completely valid procedure for pre-
paring engineering economy studies~ i·~·· 
making investment choices when capital ad-
ditions and revenues are contemplated at 
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different time intervals. We find the 
application of the ECM methodology, how-
ever, wholly inappropriate for utility 
rate-making. 
* * * 
..• If we were dealing with a static 
plant, the impact on total revenues would 
not be perceptible. However, 2-Tier pric-
ing is being proposed by NET for its most 
advanced and presumably most rapidly grow-
ing PBX offering. Under situations of 
market growth, we have substantially a 
negative flow-through effect . . . . As 
the gross plant investment increases year 
by year, the cumulative revenue deficien-
cies between the sum of annuity payments 
and a corresponding depreciation, return 
and taxes widens. 
* * * 
The company can contemplate the offering 
of 2-Tier pricing on a present worth an-
nuity basis only because of its monopoly 
position. Approximately 90% of company 
revenues are derived from monopoly ser-
vice classifications. Deficiencies in 
return during the early stages of Dimension 
PBX service can be recouped through over-
all state-wide rate of return adjustments. 
To apply ECM procedures universally to 
all NET services would ensure corporate 
insolvency. (D.P.U. 18403, Decision of 
April 21, 1976, pp. 17, 19, 21) (empha-
sis added)20/ 
20/Similarly, in its recent Dimension two-tier decision, the 
Montana Public Service Commission reasoned as follows: 
The ECM-FGR debate revolves around the 
question: Are Dimension •.. services 
provided by single units of investment 
or assets which are members of a pool? 
In Finding of Fact No. 77, the Commission 
(footnote continued on next page) 
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The Utah Commission totally ignored all the record evi-
dence dealing with the "equated cost of money" methodology, 
evidence which shows that its use makes two-tier TelaLease 
tariffs dependent, for their compensatory sufficiency, on the 
existence of monopoly revenues. The "equated cost of money" 
methodology necessitates the use of non-two-tier TelaLease 
revenues to cross-subsidize two-tier TelaLease subscribers in 
the earlier years of their service, and thus constitutes a 
classic transfer of monopoly power in further violation of 
federal antitrust law. (United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 
100 (1948); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 u.s. 
366 (1973)) 
In sum, the Commission erred in approving, by its si-
lence, the equated cost of money methodology.· This is but one 
additional reason why the overwhelming weight of the evidence 
below compels the conclusion that two-tier TelaLease pricing 
violates the antitrust laws. 
(footnote continued from previous page} 
has rejected the proposal of unchanging 
tier A payments which would have resulted 
in vintage pricing. Consistent with that 
earlier Finding, the equated cost of money 
method is rejected in favor of the fore-
casted growth reserve approach which com-
putes the return requirement on average 
net investment in an equipment account 
rather than on average investment in a 
single piece of equipment. An undepreci-
ated balance of 77.98% shall be used for 
PBX's . . . . (Order No. 4389d, Sept. 29, 
1978, Finding 92 at p. 34) 
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POINT II - THE COMMISSION ERRED IN APPROVING AN INCREMENTAL 
COSTING METHODOLOGY FOR USE BY MOUNTAIN BELL IN CONNECTION 
WITH COMPETITIVE SERVICE OFFERINGS. 
As noted by the Commission in its Report and Order (p. 7, 
R. 1140), Mountain Bell asserted below that its terminal tele-
phone equipment tariffs "covered all of its incremental costs 
of providing these .•. services". (emphasis added) Mountain 
Bell rel1ed on a so-called Long-Run Incremental Analysis (LRIA) 
wnich proportedly takes into account "cost factors, demand 
elasticity, cross-elasticity, payment plans, incrementalism 
and contribution". (Report and Order, p. 7) In contrast to 
the marginal or incremental pricing approach which the 
Commission approved for Mountain Bell's terminal equipment 
services, Intervenor-Appellant, and the Commission's own staff, 
urged that a true fully allocated costing ~ethodology be used. 
(Ex~ D~l, R. 1526, pp. 4, 6-7; Tr. 397-98; Tr. 949, 951-52; 
Tr. 995-98, 1009) 
The difference between these two costing methodologies 
has to do primarily with the sufficiency of Mountain Bell's 
allocation, in its Dimension PBX and ComKey tariffs, for an 
aliquot portion of common overhead Company costs. Taking only 
"directly related administration costs" into account, Mountain 
Bell utilized an administrative overhead factor of 6.5% (Tr. 
452, 925), whereas Intervenor-Appellant proposed an allocation 
equal to 9.85% of total investment (Ex. I-8, R. 1535, p. 53, 
J.W.-15(a); Tr. 934-35) 
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Intervenor-Petitioner submits that the Commission erone-
ously lent its approval to a costing methodology which does 
not account for an appropriate portion of common administra-
tive overhead costs. 
Mountain Bell argued below that no allowance whatsoever 
should be made for fixed, or common, overhead costs. (Tr. 
60, 232, 830, 883) The Company's position is that rather than 
select a formula which might be deemed "arbitrary", it pre-
ferred to make no allocation at all. Dr. Wilson, Intervenor-
Appellant's expert witness, found: 
MB's rates do not include a proper allo-
cation of joint costs which are shared 
with other services. Instead, they cover· 
only costs directly attributable to 
Dimension PBX service. Thus, "overhead" 
costs have been excluded. Overhead in-
cludes such items as headquarters build-
ings and general office buildings, heat-
ing and lighting costs associated with 
those buildings, executive salar-ies, law-
yers' fees, etc. The assignment of all 
these costs to monopoly. telephone ser-
vices constitutes a direct subsidy of 
Dimension PBX. Obviously, such costs 
must be included in tne determination of 
the prices of products sold in competi-
tive markets. (Ex. I-8, R. 1535, p. 7) 
The record evidence also contains testimony which indi-
cates that, in addition to being non-compensatory, MBT's cost-
ing methodology is anti-competitive. Speaking of Mountain 
Bell's short-run incremental pricing methodology, Dr. Wilson 
stated: 
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The result is to create an unfair economic 
advantage for MB in the pricing of its PBX 
products. Competitors must recover all 
their costs; they simply do not have the 
artificial advantage of being able to 
arbitrarily charge off some cost elements 
to non-competitive lines of enterprise 
and thereby suosidize their competitive 
operations. For MB to allocate Dimension 
PBX overhead costs to the rate base and 
operating expenses of the franchised por-
tion of its general telephone utility op-
erations is ruinous to independent PBX 
competitors and unfair to MB's other tele-
phone utility subscribers who are faced 
with monopoly conditions and have no 
choice but to pay inflated prices that 
are high enough to cover these unfairly 
allocated rate base and operating ex-
penses in addition to their own costs of 
service. 
To allow one competitor (MB) to allocate 
some of its costs to other product lines 
that are protected from competition, and 
recover those costs from its monopoly 
lines, cannot be justified on rational 
economic grounds. (Ex. I-8, R. 1535, pp. 
8-9) 
MBT's LRIA analysis, which forms the theoretical justifi-
cation for its incremental pricing methodology, purportedly 
makes a "contribution" to common overhead. (See Tr. 61, 283.) 
But there is no way of determining whether the alleged mar-
ginal "contribution" is sufficient to actually recover all 
costs. According to MBT, one purpose of the LRIA is to serve 
as "a tool for selecting prices". (Tr. 63) Mountain Bell's 
LRIA pays lip service to costs such as premature retirement, 
and common overhead, but makes no attempt to quantify these 
costs. The LRIA offered by Mountain Bell is nothing more than 
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its own self-serving judgment and guesswork about possible 
market activity. No economic data, or quantifiable elasticity 
of demand, appears. The LRIA thus amounts to pure guesswork 
performed by Company executives whose duty it is to justify a 
price long-since designed not to meet costs, but to suppress 
competition. The guesswork is then fed into a complicated 
game theory which projects what old and new customers would 
or might do - again without any empirical data or experience 
whatsoever. Mountain Bell's witness even admitted that he 
had no idea, for example, "how much it is costing or will cost" 
for "the telephone company to proceed throug~ this proceeding 
here in Utah". (Tr. 436) 
Once again, in response to this evidence, the Commission 
made virtually no findings whatsoever. Once again, other 
than its glib assertion that all of the business terminal 
telephone equipment services at issue "are priced at a level 
which will recover for Mountain Bell all of its costs asso-
ciated with the provision of said products and services" 
(Report and Order, p. 11, R. 1142), none of the conflict be-
tween costing methodologies which saturates the record is even 
referenced, much less resolved, by the Commission. 
By contrast, in other jurisdictions where the same con-
flict in costing methodologies has arisen, state commissions 
have made a meaningful attempt to come to grips with the is-
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sues. Thus, based on a record virtually identical to that 
before the Utah Commission, the Montana Public Service 
Commission concluded: 
The Commission finds that Mountain Bell's 
long run incremental analysis is not an 
appropriate procedure for price setting 
by a regulated utility selling in both 
monopoly and competitive markets. 
Responsible regulation by this Commission 
is premised on iis ability to compare 
rates with the cost of service, insuring 
that the proposed rates are compensatory. 
On relying on forecasted costs and market 
conditions, LRIA provides less assurance 
that rates will cove~ actual costs than 
does a comparison of rates with historic 
costs. LRIA considers only those costs 
the utility regards as incremental, thus 
creating the possibility of cross-subsidi-
zation if rates based on such analysis do 
not cover full costs including an alloca-
tion of common overheads. With the 
Company's residual pricing policy, the 
potential subsidy would be from basic ex-
change ratepayers to those using competi-
tive services. (Montana Public Service 
Commission, Docket No. 6496, Order No. 
4389d, Sept. 29, 1978, Finding 63 at pp. 
22-23. (emphasis added) 
The Montana Public Service Commission appropriately con-
eluded, "to insure the absense of cross-subsidies, rates for 
telephone services should be set equal to fully-distributed 
costs". (Order No. 4389d, Finding 67 at p. 24) 
In addition, after considering arguments in favor of in-
cremental costs by the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company 
very similar to those advanced below by Mountain Bell, the 
California Public Utilities Commission, last year, cogently 
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and concisely reasoned: 
Where a public utility and a non-regulated 
enterprise are competing for the same mar-
ket and scarcity of products or service is 
not a factor, the proper choice becomes 
quite clear. The use of the incremental 
cost concept to justify the price of an 
offering by the utility in such a competi-
tive situation would allow the utility to 
allocate its overhead and fixed costs to 
its monopoly services. Leaving the ef-
fects of such an allocation on the util-
ity's competitors aside, incremental cost 
pricing would obviously be unfair to the 
utility's monopoly customers in that they 
would bear all costs except the incremental 
costs associated with competitive markets. 
The unfairness of the incremental cost ap-
proach on the utility's monopoly customers 
would alone be sufficient to rule its use. 
The requirement that we must consider the 
anti-competitive aspects of the utility's 
offering upon suppliers who have no monopo-
ly service to bear the overhead and fixed 
costs further militates against incremental 
cost pricing. (Cal. P.u.c., Decision No. 
87962, October 12, 1977, p. 47)21/ 
21/Similarly, the New York Public Service Commission, last 
year, had occasion to comment on the use of a long-run 
incremental analysis by the New York Telephone Company to 
justify its terminal telephone equipment rates. In denying 
a request for subpoena duces ~, the New York Commission 
wrote: 
(footnote 
It is the Commission's opinion that the 
issue presented • • • is whether the 
rates chosen by New York Telephone 
Company are compensatory, not whether 
the rates chosen by the Company are 
superior to other rates in the sense that 
they will maximize the net revenue con-
tribution from the service • • • • (TJ he 
Commission will give no weight to any 
claim by the Company that its proposed 
continued on next page) 
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So too, in this case, the Commission should have rejected 
the Company's so-called LRIA. The Commission should have de-
manded a full and complete cost study which fairly takes into 
account all costs associated with competitive services, in-
eluding a fair portion of the common overhead of the firm. 
Although the main thrust of this Point II has to do with 
the non-compensatory nature of Mountain Bell's incremental 
costing methodology, it must be noted that the use of marginal 
or incremental cost pricing, absent a proper allocation for 
fixed overheads, has been declared illegal under the federal 
antitrust laws. More than half a century ago, in Northern 
Pacific Railway v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585 (1915), 
the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected the pric-
ing of utility services on an incremental or "out-of-pocket" 
cost basis: 
••• (W]e entertain no doubt that in de-
terming the cost of the transportation of 
a particular commodity, all the outlays 
which pertain to it must be considered. 
We find no basis for distinguishing in 
this respect between the so-called "out-
of-pocket c~sts", or "actual" expenses 
and other outlays which are nonetheless 
actually made because they are applica-
ble to all traffic in question. 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
rates will optimize the revenue contribu-
tion from the service. (N.Y.P.S.C. Case 
27006, letter of S.R. Madison, Secretary, 
to K.J. Roland, January 25, 1977) (empha-
sis added) 
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It is not sufficent reason for excluding 
such, or other, expenses to say that they 
would still have been incurred had the 
particular commodity not been transported. 
That commodity has been transported; the 
common carrier is under a duty to carry, 
and the expenses of its business at a 
particular time are attributable to what 
it does carry . . . The outlays that ex-
clusively pertain to a given class of traf-
fic must be assigned to that class, and 
the other expenses must be fairly appor-
tioned. It may be difficult to make such 
an apportionment, but once conclusions 
are based on cost, the entire cost must 
be taken into account. (Northern 
Pacific Railway, supra, at 596-97) (empha-
sis added) 
In more recent years, the United States Supreme Court, 
in American Commercial Lines v. Louisville & Nashville 
Railway co., 392 U.S. 571 (1968), upheld an ICC determination 
that inter-modal transportation competitive rates should be 
set on the basis of fully distributed costs, as opposed to 
22/ 
out-of-pocket or marginal costs. Without belaboring the 
point further, numerous lower court and state court deci-
sions are to the same effect. See, ~.g., Inglis & Sons 
Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 1975-1 Trade Cas. 
Para. 60146 (D.C.N.D. Cal. 1975); Tri-Cue, Inc. v. Sta-High 
Corp., 45 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1965); Northern Natual Power Co. v. 
22/And see AT&T Long Lines Department (Revisions of Tariff 
FCC No.~O Private Line Services 5000 (TelPak), 61 FCC 2d 
587, 615 (1976), where the Federal Communications Commission 
mandated use by carriers of fully distributed costs in the de-
termination of rate levels. 
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City of St. Paul, 99 N.W. 2d 207 (Minn. 1957); St. Michael's 
Utilities Comm'n. v. The Eastern Shore Public Service Co. of 
Maryland, 35 F.P.C. 591, aff'd, 377 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1967); 
Paine v. Washington Metropolitan Area ·rransit Comm'n, 415 F.2d 
910 ( D. C. Cir • 19 6 8 ) • 
This is plainly not a case which falls within the ambit 
of the Tenth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals' recent decision 
in Pacific Eng. & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee, 551 F.2d 790 (10th 
Cir. 1977). While the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in that 
case allowed AMPOT, a multi-product firm, to utilize incre-
mental costs, that case is plainly distinguishable from the 
one at bar in that all of AMPOT's operations were in competi-
tive markets. Mountain Bell, on the other hand, is engaged 
in a variety of operations which fall both within the competi-
tive and monopoly areas. 
There is nothing illegal under the antitrust laws, nor 
should there be, about a multi-product, totally competitive, 
firm engaging in cross-subsidization. If the price of compe-
titive product "A" is raised to cross-subsidize competitive 
product "B", then, sooner or later, competitive product "A" 
will be priced out of the market in which it competes. 
Product "A" sales will have been sacrificed for the benefit 
of product "S" sales. The same statement cannot be made with 
respect to MST. MST cannot be priced out of its monopoly mar-
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kets in the State of Utah. Where Mountain Bell's general tele-
phone exchange services are concerned, it enjoys an absolute 
monopoly and it need not concern itself with raising prices 
above those of its competitors. It has no competitors in the 
general exchange service market. Thus, while the use of in-
cremental pricing may have been permissible with respect to 
AMPOT, it is impermissible and totally unacceptable where MBT 
is concerned. Any reliance by Mountain Bell on the Pacific 
Engineering decision would ignore the di~ference between a 
completely competitive, multi-product company and a multi-
product company which is engaged in the provision of both com-
petitive and monopoly services. 
The Commission erred in approving Mountain Bell's incre-
mental cost methodology. 
Conclusion 
For all the foregoing reasons, the Final Report and Order 
of the Public Service Commission of Utah in PSC Case No. 
76-049-01 should be reversed; all two-tier TelaLease contracts 
entered into by Mountain Bell with its customers since December 
2, 1977 should be set aside; and Mountain Bell should be 
directed not to offer any additional terminal telephone equip-
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ment services on a two-tier TelaLease payment plan or on the 
basis of tariffs based on an incremental costing methodology. 
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